Poetic License: Learning Morality from Fiction in light of Imaginative Resistance by Rosenbaum, John W.
  
 
teorema 
Vol. XXXV/3, 2016, pp. 165-183 
ISSN: 0210-1602 
[BIBLID 0210-1602 (2016) 35:3; pp. 165-183] 
165 
 
 
Poetic License: Learning Morality from Fiction in Light 
of Imaginative Resistance 
 
John W. Rosenbaum 
 
 
RESUMEN 
La resistencia imaginativa (RI) rechaza una afirmación que es cierta dentro de un 
mundo de ficción. Las explicaciones que describen RI sostienen que los lectores abando-
nan la ficción en los puntos de resistencia. Pero si la resistencia entraña que se sale de una 
ficción, no se produce entonces el aprendizaje moral a partir de ella. Pero el aprendizaje 
moral a partir de la ficción ocurre; algunos de estos casos son ejemplos de la aceptación 
de una norma que anteriormente se ha negado. Rectifico las soluciones actuales a RI con 
la licencia poética. Cuanto más licencia poética se concede a una obra, más flexible es 
uno con respecto a falsedades percibidas. En lugar de abandonar la ficción, uno tiene la 
oportunidad de seguir participando y posiblemente aprender las normas que previamente 
negó. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: filosofía de la ficción, resistencia imaginativa, liciencia poética, Tamar Gendler, 
Brian Weatherson. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Imaginative resistance (IR) is rejecting a claim that is true within a fictional world. 
Accounts that describe IR hold that readers exit a fiction at points of resistance. But if 
resistance entails exiting a fiction, then learning morality from fiction doesn’t occur. But 
moral learning from fiction does occur; some such cases are instances of accepting a 
norm one first denied. I amend current solutions to IR with poetic license. The more po-
etic license granted a work, the more flexible one is regarding perceived falsehoods. In-
stead of exiting the fiction, one has the chance to stay engaged and possibly learn norms 
she previously denied. 
 
KEYWORDS: Philosophy of Fiction, Imaginative Resistance, Poetic License, Tamar Gendler, Brian 
Weatherson. 
 
 
We grant authors much freedom in the worlds they create—the enti-
ties present, the events that occur, and even the concepts that appear in 
their fictional worlds. But there’s a limit to what readers can allow to be pre-
sent. This notion – imaginative resistance – is the subject of several puzzles, 
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two of which are the focus of this piece.1 An alethic puzzle is raised 
when an authoritative narrator asserts some claim the reader denies as 
true, and a phenomenological puzzle is the jarring experience felt when 
we encounter alethic puzzles. For example, consider ‘It is morally praise-
worthy that Voldemort tortures puppies for fun’. We not only reject this 
moral claim, but its very assertion in a narrative would be shocking. 
Current imaginative-resistance theories assert that we are unable to 
stay engaged with a piece of fiction when we encounter an alethic puzzle; 
the force of the accompanying phenomenological puzzle jolts us right 
out of the imaginative experience. If this were true then certain types of 
learning from fiction – for example, learning moral prescriptions – become 
impossible. However, it seems that at least some cases of learning moral 
norms from fiction are instances of coming to hold a prescription one 
previously denied as true. If a story’s explicit moral claims have to agree 
with the reader’s for the reader to stay engaged, then we’ve no way to ac-
count for such cases. 
After presenting current theories and showing them ill equipped for 
such learning, I will describe a solution such that imaginative resistance 
does not have to impede learning moral norms from fiction. 
 
 
I. THE SETUP 
 
I.1 Terms and Parameters 
I assume that it is possible to learn moral truths from fiction, of the 
form ‘one ought (not) to do x’. The moral truths in question are those as-
sertions made by an author in a fiction that the reader initially believes 
are false.2 
In line with Ken Walton, I take it that reading a fiction is tanta-
mount to agreeing to play a game of make-believe with an author. In this 
imaginative activity what is fictionally true is what the reader is invited to 
imagine [Walton (1990), pp. 35-7]. Imaginative resistance is our alleged ina-
bility to continue to participate in such imaginative activities under cer-
tain circumstances. We here focus on two of the four imaginative-
resistance-puzzle types. 
An alethic puzzle is one in which it can be said that authorial authori-
ty breaks down, where an author says something is true in the fiction 
that the reader rejects as false. The puzzle here is that, despite the general 
belief that authors can make true whatever they want in their own stories, 
the reader sometimes cannot accept some particular claim as fictionally true. 
Poetic License: Learning Morality from Fiction in Light of…                         167 
 
The following story is a paradigmatic example of the alethic puzzle 
and of readers’ imaginative limits [Weatherson (2004), p. 1].3 
 
Death on a Freeway 
 
Jack and Jill went up the hill to collect some stuff. 
Their argument, though just a stint, got Craig all in a huff. 
“This traffic jam’s cuz they won’t scram!” (That isn’t really true!) 
Craig pulled out his gun, now their lives are done; that was the right 
thing for Craig to do. 
 
Jack and Jill were having an argument, Craig incorrectly attributed the 
traffic jam to this argument, killed the two, and we’re told that his action 
was morally right. The alethic puzzle is found in asserting that Craig’s 
killing people in cold blood is the right thing to do. We tend to think that 
killing over an incorrectly attributed infraction is wrong. The story ex-
plicitly dubs this morally deviant action praiseworthy. It is true in the sto-
ry that murder is morally permissible.4 
A phenomenological puzzle is the jarring experience puzzling sentences 
give us. It is the “Wait… what?!” response elicited by reading the sen-
tence that included “that was the right thing for Craig to do.” 
Puzzling sentences are simply the specific sentences in which puzzles 
are raised by explicit claims intentionally presented in the voice of the au-
thoritative narrator. We will not concern ourselves with implicit moral 
assertions. Though such explicit statements are likely fairly rare in serious 
literature, for illustrative purposes they shall be our focus nonetheless. 
After explaining the puzzles, the next objective will be to identify 
solutions to these puzzles, i.e. give an account of all and only the cases 
where a puzzle is raised. 
 
I.2 More Stories 
Brian Weatherson (whose view is discussed in detail below) offers 
the following story and explication to show that the alethic and phenom-
enological puzzles—while related—are distinct, and therefore need dis-
tinct solutions. 
 
The Benefactor 
 
Smith was a very generous, just, and in every respect moral man. 
Every month he held a giant feast for the village where they were 
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able to escape their usual diet of grains, fruits, and vegetables to eat 
the many and varied meats that Smith provided for them. 
 
If someone believes we are morally required to be vegetarian, then she 
takes it that it is morally wrong for Smith to serve the villagers meat and 
so Smith will therefore not be moral “in every respect.” For those who 
believe we are so required this story raises a phenomenological puzzle 
though for meat eaters it raises no such puzzle. And if it really is true 
that we are morally required to be vegetarians then this story also raises 
an alethic puzzle without raising the phenomenological puzzle for meat 
eaters [Weatherson (2004), p. 21]. 
For my part I don’t see how a phenomenological puzzle can be 
raised without at least the belief that an alethic puzzle has also. Vegetari-
ans have a jarring experience just because they believe an alethic puzzle has 
been raised, whether or not the claim in the story contradicts an actual 
truth. Seemingly a quibble, but this will be important. 
Compare the above stories to the following. 
 
Sword Dual 
 
She picked up the magic sword and with the sharp blade sliced 
through her enemy! As momentum carried her forward the blade 
bounced harmlessly off the fair skin of her lover.5 
 
A woman cut through her enemy with a magic sword, a sword that then 
harmlessly bounced off her lover. However, a sword that is both sharp 
and dull isn’t puzzling because it’s stipulated as magical. Given magic, we 
let weird things like incompatible properties slide. There are clearly cases 
in fiction that cannot actually be true but that we don’t find puzzling. 
 
 
II. THE SOLUTIONS 
 
II.1 Phenomenological puzzles 
Tamar Szabó Gendler’s thought is that a phenomenological puzzle 
is raised any time a sentence makes us respond, That’s what you think and 
thereby abandon the fiction. Craig’s action was morally right – “That’s what 
you think.” By contrast, we don’t experience a phenomenological puzzle 
in the magic-sword case. A sword has incompatible properties – “Sure, it’s 
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magical.” In cases where the puzzle is raised the fictional spell is broken 
and we exit the game of make-believe, otherwise we remain engaged. 
This solution correctly predicts that there is no puzzle if Death on a 
Freeway is just an entry in Craig’s diary – we will think that Craig’s moral 
evaluation of his own action is wrong, but we won’t find it puzzling. 
The degree of narratorial authority (opposed simply to authorial au-
thority) is an important factor in our ability to learn from a fiction, de-
veloped below. For now, note that as the narrator approaches 
omniscience the more seriously the reader takes assertions in the text.  
 
II.2 Alethic Puzzles 
A seemingly easy solution to alethic puzzles is that readers won’t 
accept as true something that is (or believed to be) metaphysically im-
possible. However, some popular fictions contain known impossibilities 
but do not generate any puzzle. Some time travel stories are such exam-
ples [Weatherson (2004), pp. 8-10]. And one can easily engage a story 
where, without magic, the protagonist displays her artistic skill by draw-
ing a round square [Rosenbaum (MS), p. 3]. A more sophisticated solu-
tion is needed to avoid over-generating puzzles. 
Gendler’s hypothesis is that our general desire is “not to be manip-
ulated into taking on points of view that we would not reflectively en-
dorse as authentically our own” [Gendler (2000), p. 76]. We deny morally 
deviant claims for either to imagine them or to accept them as true in a 
story is to commit oneself to their truth in actuality. How does that con-
sequence follow? 
First, note that some things are true in a story just because they are 
true in our world. For example we take it that ‘Sherlock has a liver’ is 
true, and that’s just because human beings actually have livers. We import 
this truth into the fiction. 
She goes on to explain the flipside, exportation. In short, “if some-
thing is true in the fictional world, it will be true in the actual world.” 
Her claim is that there are many things that we know are true in the fic-
tion that are also true in the actual world, truths that were not meant by 
the author to be merely true in the story; for example the lesson of “the 
painfulness of unrequited love” [Gendler (2000), p. 76]. The more realis-
tic the fiction, the more truths we are free to export from it. 
Call this the: 
 
Import-export Principle – moral norms are true in a story just in case 
they are true in the actual world. 
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Gendler’s Import-export Principle offers an explanation for how it is we 
learn moral norms from fictional works. When I read some assertion in a 
fiction (i) that I had not previously considered but (ii) that I don’t think 
is false, together with the Import-export Principle, I simply export the pre-
scription from the fiction into the actual world and endorse it as my 
own. 
When it comes to puzzling assertions Gendler’s principle handles it in 
the following manner. Consider: 
 
1. Moral norms are true in a story just in case they are true in the 
actual world. 
 
2. Murder is morally permissible in Death on a Freeway. 
 
 
3. So, murder is morally permissible in the actual world. 
 
According to Gendler’s view – given the Import-export Principle as our de-
fault fictional interpretation principle (premise (1)) – we are forced to 
deny (2) to avoid accepting the puzzling conclusion that murder is actual-
ly morally permissible. But by stipulating an omniscient narrator it will 
simultaneously be true and false that murder is morally permissible within 
the fictional world of Death on a Freeway. To avoid contradiction I deny (1). 
Gendler says in response to something like the above argument 
that we as readers are aware that the author does not offer for export 
“bizarre” moral norms. The less realistic the story (the more bizarre or 
more frequent the claims), the less seriously we are meant to take the au-
thor’s assertion of those claims. Since “there is no straightforward export 
being offered... [our] inclination to resist diminishes,” i.e. we impose ex-
port restrictions on the story for the truths the author didn’t intend for 
us to export, in this case premise (2) [Gendler (2000), p. 76]. 
An initial concern asks how we are supposed to know what the au-
thor intends for us to take as serious assertions. Unless the author makes 
it explicit which assertions fall into which category the realistic nature of 
the story is a poor guide. Harry Potter contains some bizarre physical truths 
by realistic standards but contains moral truths that are consistent with 
ours. On the other hand – filling in the story in the relevant ways – the 
physical facts of Death on a Freeway are on par with ours, but the morality 
of that world is clearly different. 
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However, just as sophisticated language users are able to pick out 
sarcasm or hyperbole, so, too, they should be able to pick up on the bi-
zarre nature of any puzzling assertions. 
A second, more troublesome concern is what if – instead of con-
sidering it a bizarre claim – the author does intend for her readers to ex-
port the norm in question, and makes it clear that this is so? What if 
there is a straightforward export being offered? Then our inclination to 
resist shouldn’t diminish for we are meant to take these bizarre-to-us as-
sertions seriously.6 
In light of the foregoing premise (1) is false and the relevant pre-
scription is avoided. 
I opt for Brian Weatherson’s solution to alethic puzzles, from Morali-
ty, Fiction, and Possibility. His idea is that an alethic puzzle is raised when a 
violation of the Virtue Principle obtains. First he defines the in-virtue-of rela-
tion as follows: 
 
The In-virtue-of relation—If x isn’t a real property of a thing, but there 
are x facts, then those facts must hold in virtue of more fundamen-
tal facts. 
 
Call the non-real property or fact that obtains the higher-level fact and the 
more fundamental facts (those in virtue of which the high-level facts ob-
tain) the lower-level facts. For example, regarding language-meaning facts: the 
Spanish “Soy el rey” means “I am the king” in English (the high-level) in 
virtue of a pattern of usage of those words by Spanish speakers (the low-
level). That Isabella Woodhouse is more like Mr. Woodhouse than is 
Emma obtains in virtue of – down the line – the actions of the three. 
Their similarity or dissimilarity is not fundamental or primitive, but ob-
tain in virtue of the physical features of the actions of the individuals 
[Weatherson (2004), p. 16]. 
Next, Weatherson gives us the Virtue Principle: 
 
The Virtue Principle (or Virtue) – If p is a high-level claim, and if the story is 
about the relevant low-level facts, then it must be true in the story that 
there is some true proposition q that is about those low-level facts such 
that p is true in virtue of q [Weatherson (2004), p. 18]. 
 
If the story claims ‘this is a good mug’ and the story is about the mug’s 
more fundamental properties (e.g. its size and thermal capacity), then it 
must be clear that ‘this is a good mug’ is true in virtue of the assertions 
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about those fundamental properties. For example, “this is a good mug 
because this mug is travel-sized and maintains my drink’s temperature 
for extended periods.” 
So then, an alethic puzzle arises in a sentence where the in-virtue-of 
relation is violated, where the proposition about the low-level facts con-
tradicts the high-level application. In Death on a Freeway the lower-level 
facts are such that Jack and Jill are innocent of the crime Craig thinks 
they are guilty of, but Craig’s false belief in their guilt is enough to justify 
their murder (according to the stipulated-as-omniscient narrator). Since a 
false belief of guilt does not justify murder, the evaluation (“that was the 
right thing for Craig to do”) contradicts the facts on the ground, and the 
sentence contains an alethic puzzle. 
Weatherson asserts Virtue is our default principle of fictional inter-
pretation, and an author cannot cancel it just by saying so [Weatherson 
(2004), p. 17]. Also, there is no opportunity for a violation of Virtue with-
out explicit low-level facts – to the extent a story introduces lower-level 
details, higher-level claims must match up with them in order to avoid a 
puzzle. If low-level facts aren’t mentioned, then there is no opportunity 
for a puzzle to obtain. For example, if the claim ‘this is a good mug’ is 
made in a story that makes no reference to the mug’s more fundamental 
properties then there is no opportunity for that claim to be puzzling. 
While Virtue seems to create a huge restriction on what an author 
can include in her own story, this is false. The author says which world a 
fiction is in and can claim any and all sorts of concepts at her world (in-
cluding contradictory ones) until she locks in on a description of that 
world. At that point our default Virtue interpretation kicks in and regu-
lates the relations between those descriptions and the concepts. “Autho-
rial authority extends as far as saying which world is fictional in the story; 
it does not extend as far as saying which concepts are instantiated there” 
[Weatherson (2004), p. 23]. 
When alethic puzzles arise there are two ways we might deal with it. 
One way might be to change the lower-level facts, for example, to add 
extra details to justify Craig’s actions. However, that could be tanta-
mount to changing the story, which likely explains why that is not how 
we deal with alethic puzzles. If an alethic puzzle arises we in fact resolve 
the tension in favor of the lower-level details. We don’t imagine that Jack 
and Jill were about to bust out machine guns and that Craig stopped 
them in order to save the townspeople. We maintain the author’s de-
scriptive facts but deny the author’s evaluation of those facts. 
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II.3 Inability to Learn 
Gendler’s Import-export Principle gives us some positive way of draw-
ing moral norms out of fictions. However it faces at least one problem I 
can’t resolve, so I must abandon it as a solution to alethic puzzles. 
Weatherson’s Virtue Principle gets the right results regarding alethic puz-
zles. However, the relationship between the alethic and phenomenologi-
cal puzzles in his account raises its own issue, viz. that if an alethic puzzle 
obtains, a phenomenological puzzle is experienced. It is this implication 
that subverts our ability to learn moral norms from fiction. 
If Weatherson is right, then we can make this argument: 
 
1. If agent S believes an alethic puzzle has been raised regarding 
moral norm M, then S experiences a phenomenological puzzle 
regarding the in-virtue-of relation between M and the relevant 
low-level facts F. 
 
2. If S experiences a phenomenological puzzle regarding the in-virtue-
of relation between M and F, then S rejects M as related to F. 
 
3. If S rejects M as related to F, then S cannot learn M from the fiction. 
 
 
4. So, if S believes an alethic puzzle has been raised regarding M, 
then S cannot learn M from the fiction. 
 
Premise (1) is the implication drawn out from Weatherson’s The Benefac-
tor: an alethic puzzle leads to the jolting experience of a phenomenologi-
cal puzzle. Premise (2) is the spelling out of That’s what you think, the 
solution to the phenomenological puzzle – a rejection of the relevant in-
virtue-of relation. Premise (3) describes what rejecting the in-virtue-of re-
lation amounts to: not learning the relevant norm. 
To spell it out more thoroughly, by Weatherson’s light I come into 
a fiction with my preconceived ideas of what selfishness is or what it takes 
for a thing to be a good mug. An author gives me a string of lower-level 
facts and applies a high-level evaluation that I don’t already agree applies 
to the relevant facts, in other words, I believe an alethic puzzle is raised. 
So then I experience a phenomenological puzzle and exit the imaginative 
game at that particular point. (This isn’t to say that I am unable to re-
enter the fiction immediately succeeding the puzzling sentence.) 
But learning doesn’t happen only when we already subscribe to the 
claim nor is it confined to cases in which we accept the claim without re-
sistance. Sometimes a moral norm is puzzling to us but we come to learn 
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it anyway. In fact, sometimes a jarring experience is just what we need in 
order to learn it.7 That is, a jolt can bring a normative claim to one’s atten-
tion for consideration (or reconsideration, as the case may be). Weather-
son’s view, however, leaves us stuck in a state of rejection. 
Weatherson’s solution is too cut-and-dried – either your high-level 
concepts match up with the author’s or you get kicked out of the game 
by the force of the puzzle. But that’s not my experience when interacting 
with a fiction. The best-case scenario with Weatherson’s view is that 
each fiction becomes a thought experiment where we can test our intui-
tions and concepts against new and different sets of descriptive facts. 
This perhaps allows for learning by negation, narrowing down the range 
of lower-level facts one believes can satisfy some concept; but this gives 
one no chance to be convinced by the author and learn something one 
previously denied. 
The weak point is at (1). We need to modify Weatherson’s account 
of the relationship between alethic puzzles and phenomenological puz-
zles to account for learning moral norms from fiction. 
 
 
III. POETIC LICENSE 
 
Weatherson’s view is that Virtue is our default interpretation principle, 
and we cannot simply abandon at an author’s request. Assuming we have 
no control over what we believe, then a consequence of Weatherson’s ac-
count is that if an alethic puzzle obtains for us we cannot force ourselves 
through the phenomenological puzzle just to accept the new evaluation. 
The phenomenological puzzle forces us out of the fiction (at least at that 
puzzling sentence). But this isn’t always the case. Sometimes we can stay 
engaged with a fiction despite recognizing an alethic puzzle. So we need a 
way to account for our ability to sometimes bypass the phenomenological 
puzzle. Poetic license is just such a means. First I give some background 
to poetic license, then I describe how it actually works. 
 
III.1 Background 
It is false that every time a reader is aware of an alethic puzzle she 
experiences a phenomenological jolt. Sometimes a reader comes across a 
normative evaluation that she rejects – and is aware of it and her rejec-
tion of it – but she can glide right past the phenomenological puzzle. 
This is due to her coming to the work of fiction with a high degree of 
poetic license. 
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Poetic license is the freedom we grant an author regarding her use of 
the in-virtue-of relation, and her violations thereof. In short, the relation-
ship between the degree of phenomenological puzzlement (Z) one experiences 
and poetic license is inverted, i.e. the more poetic license granted, the 
smaller the degree of phenomenological puzzlement experienced. The 
relationship isn’t perfectly inverted, as we’ll see in section IV. 
Poetic license is the function through which different facets of the 
reader, author, text, and genre play a role in determining how strongly (if 
at all) the reader feels the jolt of a phenomenological puzzle. 
For example, consider cases where it’s known to the reader that the 
author tends to make outlandish evaluations. In such cases the reader 
can be perfectly aware that an alethic puzzle is raised yet take it in stride. 
That is, the reader can avoid being shocked altogether. More likely, she’ll 
be shocked to some noticeable degree, but she needn’t feel the shock at 
all. Either way, we have what we need to deny premise (1) of the above 
argument. 
Before describing more clearly what’s going on with poetic license, 
I want to enumerate some of the various components that go into it. 
This will make describing the details of poetic license’s operation easier. 
Authorial Authority is the amount of authority we grant the author, 
typically based on our own readings of the author, how well (we think) 
the author knows the subject matter or is experienced with the present 
genre, reviews we’ve heard praising or criticizing the author, etc. The 
more we trust the author to get things right, the more poetic license we 
grant, the lower Z. (The inverse is true, too: the more alethic puzzles we 
see the author raise, the less we trust the author to get things right, the 
less poetic license we grant.) For example, I’ve loved the Jane Austen 
novels I’ve read so far. If, in the next Austen novel I read, she indicates 
that a certain character is vicious who I initiallly thought to be nice, then I 
like or trust Austen enough not to be (too) shocked at her evaluation. 
This isn’t to say that I will buy into Austen’s claim without reflec-
tion just because it’s Austen that makes it. In that case I don’t see an ale-
thic puzzle arising at all. Rather, assuming it’s a situation in which I don’t 
question Austen’s description of the antecedent fictional state of affairs, 
I can trust Austen’s moral sensibilities enough to do one of several 
things. First, I might be suspicious of my own evaluation of the lower-
level facts and provisionally accept Austen’s evaluation (that is, until I see 
how this character and the relevant events play out in the larger story). 
Second, I might simply suspend judgment on whose evaluation is cor-
rect. Finally, I might reject this particular evaluation but simply let it slide 
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just so I can stay engrossed in an Austen novel. After all, we all get some-
thing wrong eventually and I trust her to get most everything else right. 
Arguably alethic puzzles arise with the first two of these options. 
For, though I don’t abandon my own evaluation of the lower-level facts, 
neither do I accept the author’s evaluation wholesale. However, in the 
third case an alethic puzzle has been raised. And so here is a case in which 
authorial authority has kept me from experiencing at all – or experiencing 
too strongly – a phenomenological jolt at reading an alethic puzzle. 
Narratorial Authority is the aforementioned degree of narratorial 
knowledge, or how much about the goings-on in the text the narrator is 
portrayed as knowing infallibly. The more omniscient the narrator is 
supposed to be, the higher the value of narratorial authority, the higher 
Z. As explained above, the more the narrator is supposed to know the 
more likely we will respond with “That’s what you think” at apparent vi-
olations of Virtue. 
Another major factor to consider is our quality expectations, or quality. 
Quality is comprised of our considerations of the overall work. A couple 
examples will elucidate the notion. First, the action-movie mishap: my wife 
wants us to spend the evening watching Face Punch, an action movie of 
very low quality.8 Or at least, that is the expectation I hold, based on the 
trailer. Expecting low quality, I grant the film a high degree of poetic li-
cense, even allowing the hero to kill intentionally the defeated main vil-
lain. I wouldn’t let a high-quality movie’s hero get away with it for I don’t 
consider that behavior heroic. However, in low-quality stories there is no 
phenomenological puzzle though I clearly acknowledge the alethic puzzle. 
One possible explanation of this freedom is because I simply don’t 
care enough about the story or its characters to be bothered by infrac-
tions of the in-virtue-of relation. Or maybe it’s because I walk into the 
movie expecting the absurd and so I take it in stride when I get it. Either 
way, alethic puzzles in low-quality works need not be shocking. 
Note that it’s not that avoiding a phenomenological puzzle makes 
one more likely to adopt the relevant moral claim, nor does it make mor-
al learning easier in a nontrivial sense. No, the evaluation will still stand 
or fall by its own merits. It’s just that, by not being shocked by the high-
er-level claim, it’s possible for the reader to evaluate the claim for herself 
from within the fictional game. (By making moral learning possible it 
makes moral learning easier, albeit in a trivial sense.) For poetic license 
just accounts for how it is we stay engaged in a fiction despite alethic 
puzzles. Recall that if Weatherson is correct, an alethic puzzle entails a 
phenomenological jolt. And that jolt entails exiting the fictional world, 
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whatever the reader’s quality expectation. And exiting the fictional world 
entails no moral learning at that point in the fiction. But such moral 
learning is possible, and low-quality expectations are one way to make it 
possible (though – likely – ineffective).9 
Compare the above to my expectations that give rise to (one aspect 
of) the Star Wars Problem. I’m what some might call a super-fan of the 
original Star Wars trilogy. My expectations for the so-called prequel sto-
ries were high. When they came out I didn’t let George Lucas get away 
with anything – e.g. I’d give up philosophy before granting that Jar Jar 
Binks is in any way cute.10  With high expectations for the franchise I am 
hypersensitive to alethic puzzles and am in an almost constant state of 
phenomenological agony watching (what it take to be) low-quality films. 
The final component to poetic license I want to consider is how 
closely held a view is for the reader, or closeness.11 The more important the 
relevant in-virtue-of relation is the less flexible we will be with it. That is, 
an increase in closeness is an increase in Z, though the inverse isn’t true 
(i.e. shock does not by default make one hold the moral norm less close-
ly). For example, readers might let an author be free and loose with attrib-
uting veganism to a character whose actions (the low-level facts) aren’t 
consistent with veganism. Or those who disagree with the claim might let 
the author assert ‘veganism is morally obligatory’ without finding it puz-
zling. I’ll never have poetic license enough to grant that Nazism is morally 
permissible nor will I let a work attribute permissibility to those horren-
dous actions that stem from a character’s commitment to Nazism. For 
Nazism’s not something I take lightly (unless Mel Brooks is involved). 
 
III.2 Poetic License in Practice 
With the details in place, I now describe how poetic license works 
in practice. 
Some of the components of poetic license are filled out before I 
pick up the novel, e.g. authorial authority and quality expectations. Oth-
ers I determine as I read the text, e.g. narratorial authority. These factors 
(and others not listed) tie together in such a way that I grant the work 
some general degree of poetic license. Then, when I come across an ale-
thic puzzle, my level of poetic license takes a hit. The more closely held 
the relevant normative claim, the harder the hit to poetic license. How-
ever, if poetic license is high enough before the alethic puzzle, it can ab-
sorb the hit and either lessen the degree of phenomenological 
puzzlement or even avoid puzzlement altogether. Of course, if there was 
some puzzlement then poetic license is now lower than when it started. 
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In this case, if further alethic puzzles arise, I’ll be more sensitive to phe-
nomenological puzzles and be more likely to exit the fiction at subse-
quent alethic puzzles. 
Poetic license is how we bypass what would normally be a puzzle, 
and thereby learn something we would otherwise miss. This model illus-
trates how it is I am able to give the work license to expand my concep-
tual applications. The more poetic license, the more I give the author the 
benefit of the doubt, and so a perceived violation of the Virtue Principle 
isn’t so jarring that it results in an automatic exiting of the game and re-
jection of the author’s higher-level evaluation. I have the chance to try 
on the author’s perspective, to wear her morality goggles, and see if I like 
it or if her claim is going to remain a puzzle. In short, premise (1) – that 
an alethic puzzle requires a phenomenological puzzle, full stop – is false 
and the conclusion is avoided. 
 
 
IV. OBJECTIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS 
 
In this section I address potential objections. In the process I clari-
fy certain aspects of what poetic license is and how it works. Finally, I 
raise some questions of my own regarding further applications of poetic 
license. 
Poetic license gives us a solution to a question raised by Emily 
Beszhak, viz. why is it we tend to allow the magical manipulation of 
physical properties but tend not to allow the magical manipulation of 
moral properties? In reply, maybe we will allow some moral fictions, e.g. 
after waving a wand veganism is true.12 But some moral fictions we can’t 
allow for they are just held too closely to the chest. No amount of wand 
waving will make what Craig did in Death on a Freeway morally permissible 
to me because that’s an in-virtue-of relation I won’t abandon. 
Another possible solution, though independent of poetic license, is 
that we can grant incompatible properties because we don’t always have 
to fill in the gaps with lower-level details (again, an author can apply any 
concepts to a world without our resisting it until the author gives a de-
scription of the relevant part of that world). But maybe certain moral 
concepts are just tied too closely to lower-level facts for us not to fill them 
in. If I read that a certain character is evil I automatically attribute to him 
certain low-level facts – perhaps of having committed murder – and so the 
high-level/low-level relation is forced. (This is mere conjecture about em-
pirical and psychological facts, and is not something I am asserting.) 
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Here’s a more general objection, using a related problem. Given the 
definition of poetic license as the inverse of Z, it is puzzling how poetic 
license can explain the reduction of imaginative resistance. For whatever 
question one raises about one concept, one can raise about the other, 
definitionally related concept. Consider: one standard question asked 
about imaginative resistance is why we experience imaginative resistance 
more with morally deviant propositions and less so with descriptively 
deviant propositions. Invoking the technical concept of poetic license 
doesn’t help, because we can simply restate the question in reverse: why 
do we grant more poetic license with descriptively deviant propositions 
than with morally deviant propositions? 
Above I admit that an answer to that question will involve specifying 
which in-virtue-of relations we hold closely. But if that’s the answer – the 
objection goes – then we do not need poetic license at all in answering the 
original question about imaginative resistance. Why do we experience 
imaginative resistance more with morally deviant propositions and less 
so with descriptively deviant propositions? It is because we hold the rel-
evant in-virtue-of relations more closely.13 
In reply, yes, closeness is doing the work in this case. A moral view 
can be held so closely that, no matter how much the reader trusts the au-
thor, she will be so shocked by an omniscient narrator incorrectly ascribing 
it to lower-level facts that she exits the fictional game. She might hold it so 
closely she is even shocked by incorrect ascriptions uttered by a non-
omniscient narrator or some other character. (Compare this to that rare per-
son who can’t abide The Lord of the Rings since orcs and magic aren’t real.) 
But closeness is not the only factor that does work related to one’s 
reactions to alethic puzzles, as noted above. For example, concerning 
moral norms that are held only moderately closely, one’s trust in the au-
thor can be the pivotal factor in determining whether or not one experi-
ences a phenomenological jolt. In short, poetic license is simply a 
common function through which these diverse components interact and 
do their work. For the components I list (and others I don’t) all play a 
part at some time or other or to some degree or other in determining our 
sensitivity to phenomenological puzzlement. 
This also explains why poetic license and Z aren’t perfectly invert-
ed. While an increase in poetic license leads to a decrease in phenomeno-
logical puzzlement, the inverse isn’t always true. For some components 
of poetic license are perfectly inverted, and some aren’t. Consider these 
asymmetrical cases. Trusting the author makes me inclined to give the 
author the benefit of the doubt in cases of alethic puzzles. Inversely, 
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coming across alethic puzzles picks away at the degree of authority I at-
tribute to the author. “Enough claims like this and I won’t be able to 
trust this author anymore!” 
However, such inverse proportion isn’t present with regard to 
closeness. Holding a moral norm closely makes me sensitive to alethic 
puzzles. But coming across alethic puzzles doesn’t by default make me 
hold onto the moral norm less closely. Perhaps I’ll come to accept the 
author’s application of this norm to those low-level facts. And perhaps I’ll 
then learn to hold this norm (or others) less closely. But this chain of 
events is far from guaranteed, no matter how many related alethic puzzles 
I come across. 
I’ve spoken of poetic license limiting the degree of the effects of 
the phenomenological puzzle, but one may ask why poetic license does 
not just limit the probability of a phenomenological puzzle obtaining? It 
seems that I am either going to reject an author’s evaluation or I am not. 
In this case, phenomenological puzzlement is binary. Consider authorial 
authority: the more I trust an author, ceteris paribus, the less likely I am to 
take issue with her assertions. 
Two things suggest poetic license reduces the degree of phenome-
nological puzzle as opposed to the likelihood of it. First, our experiences 
of shock are consistent with the ‘varying degree’ analysis. The claim that 
Mr. Collins is kind and considerate would be slightly shocking compared 
to the claim that Voldemort is. 
Second, a decrease in degree is a more accurate analysis because a 
mere decrease in probability would maintain the all-or-nothing aspect of 
Weatherson’s view that we seek to avoid, if for no other reason than an 
all-or-nothing response to conceptual evaluations presents a false di-
lemma. It’s not the case that for every in-virtue-of relation we face we ei-
ther accept it or reject it. There is always at least the option of 
suspending judgment. 
Another potential worry goes like this: “Component x, according to 
this account, adjusts poetic license in one direction; but in my experience 
x adjusts poetic license in the other direction.” Here’s the most common 
example offered. As I’ve described one’s quality expectations, a super-
fan of a franchise is disinclined to grant poetic license. But some think 
that one’s love of a franchise makes one inclined to give the author free-
dom to bend the rules or push the limits, and therefore makes one less 
inclined to experience a phenomenological puzzle. 
In reply, first note that quality expectation is a broad category. There 
are many parts of a story, both in regard to content and to form, and so 
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maybe, if we were to parse out more fully which aspect of the story on 
which we’re placing the relevant expectations, we might find that our 
dispositions for adjustment coincide. 
And even if we weren’t to come to agreement, this is still consistent 
with my account of poetic license. The material point is that facts in and 
about the text – together with psychological facts about the particular 
reader – affect the reader’s sensitivity to phenomenological puzzles. 
Poetic license accurately predicts that different readers are puzzled 
by different sentences. Since each reader comes to each reading with her 
own set of values for each component of poetic license, we can see how 
it is that what’s puzzling for one might not be puzzling for another. And 
this, as far as I can tell, also carries into how we react to each component 
in terms of the direction we adjust our phenomenological sensitivity. 
After seeing the general success of poetic license in learning from 
literature containing explicit puzzling sentences, the next logical step is to 
try poetic license out on implied moral norms in literature, or even in 
other forms of fictional media like film. If one were to make explicit the 
facts of a movie and analyze the relevant in-virtue-of relations I see no 
reason why, for any puzzles that are raised, poetic license couldn’t handle 
them. It would be interesting to see if implied normative evaluations elic-
it puzzles and, if so, can poetic license handle them? 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Current imaginative resistance theories do not account for learning 
moral norms from stories in cases of resistance. Poetic license accounts 
for our ability to diminish the degree of the phenomenological jolt that 
accompanies alethic puzzles, allowing us to learn some higher-level eval-
uation from a fiction.14 
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NOTES 
 
1 The concept of imaginative resistance was first popularized by Ken Wal-
ton (1990), with Greg Currie (1990) quickly chiming in. The constituent puzzles 
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were parsed out by Brian Weatherson (2004). Solutions to the puzzles split into 
two main branches, (i) author/text-based solutions (championed by Tamar 
Gendler (2000), Weatherson, and Yablo (2002)), and (ii) reader-based solutions 
(the key contenders being Currie (2002), Matravers (2003), and Nichols (2006)). 
2 The question of necessary moral truths is here irrelevant—each reader 
has his or her own set of moral beliefs so each reader has the potential to be 
puzzled by different assertions. More on this below. 
3 I adapted Weatherson’s story to be a limerick. 
4 There are some theories, e.g. Tamar Gendler’s (2000) that deny that it is 
true in the story that murder is morally permissible. Her view is discussed in de-
tail below. 
5 This story is a variation of John Phillips’s (1999), who attributes the 
example to Greg Currie (1990). 
6 Weatherson objects to Gendler’s solution along similar lines [Weather-
son (2004), pp. 12-3]. 
7 A point made by Frances Howard-Snyder. 
8 There is a distinction between expectations of quality and expectations 
of genres. My character-development expectations for actions stories are unlike 
my expectations for romances. This is an important distinction, but action-
movie mishap simply highlights the distinction between what we expect from a 
so-called B-movie versus from a Hollywood blockbuster. 
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to elaborate on these last 
couple points. 
10 This is to say nothing of the storyline inconsistencies between the origi-
nal and prequel trilogies. 
11 There are other components that might play a role in determining one’s 
phenomenological sensitivity. For example, genre expectations – a sci-fi piece might 
get away with more physically deviant claims than a romance novel. Also there 
is historical distance – a reader might let an ancient Greek tragedy posit that slavery 
is permissible, but she’d be loath to let a modern story assert the same. 
12 Poetic license gets the right results in light of views that allow for shift-
ing moralities – denying there are necessarily true moral norms gives one an eas-
ier time accepting moral shifts than holding that there are such necessary truths. 
Those in the latter camp will, I imagine, either believe the narrator is mistaken 
on the relevant point or be jolted out of the fiction. 
13 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this objection. 
14 Thanks to Frances Howard-Snyder, Hud Hudson, Neal Tognazzini, 
Dennis Whitcomb, Christopher Tomaszewski, Christopher Britton, Emily 
Beszhak, Geoff Briggs, two anonymous referees, and attendees of Baylor Uni-
versity’s weekly graduate colloquium for helpful feedback on this work. 
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